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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Earl Wayne Steele appeals from the district court's denial of his petition for post-
conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The district court Decision on Petition for Post Conviction Relief describes 
Steele's underlying criminal case and appellate proceedings as follows: 
In State v. Steele, Ada County Case No. CR-FE-2007-0001541, 
Petitioner Earl Wayne Steele was indicted on three counts of Lewd 
Conduct With A Minor Under Sixteen and one count of Sexual Abuse of a 
Child Under the age of Sixteen Years. On March 13, 2008, he reached a 
plea agreement with the State. The State filed an amended indictment 
that changed Count I to Sexual Abuse Of A Minor Child Under The Age Of 
Sixteen Years, a Felony in violation of I.C. § 18-1506. Defendant pled 
guilty to Count 1 and the remaining counts were dismissed.[il Defendant 
was sentenced on May 15, 2008 to seven years fixed followed by eighteen 
years indeterminate. He appealed that sentence claiming the sentence 
exceeded the statutory maximum and that the sentence was an abuse of 
discretion. The sentence was affirmed. Pursuant to a subsequent Rule 
35 motion to correct an illegal sentence, the court on July 1, 2010 reduced 
the sentence to seven years fixed followed by eight years indeterminate, 
which was the maximum sentence permitted at the time the crime was 
committed. 
(R., pp.173-174.) 
Steele filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief presenting twelve claims. 
(R., pp.4-17.) After the district court appointed counsel to represent Steele (R., p.23), 
the state filed an Answer to Steele's petition (R., pp.33-35), and the district court filed a 
1 Steele pled guilty pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). (R., 
p.175.) 
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Notice of Intent to Dismiss (R., pp.37-39). Steele's newly appointed counsel then filed 
an Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief (R., ppA4-48), and the state responded 
by filing an Answer (R., pp.54-57) and a Motion for Summary Dismissal of Amended 
Petition (R., pp.58-59). 
Steele filed a "Motion to Amend Petioner's [sic] Amended Petition" (R., pp.78-80), 
and a proposed "Second Amended Petition for Post-Conviction" (R., p.81) in which he 
sought to present the following two claims: 
A. Petitioner's acceptance of the Alford plea was induced by two linked 
contrary acts of counsel: delusive advice and failure to advise defendant 
on relevant law attached to the plea. 
B. Counsel acknowledged defendant's participation in a Psychosexual 
evaluation despite recognizing the conclusion with Petitioner's state of 
mind. 
(R., p.82 (verbatim).) After a hearing, the district court granted Steele's motion to file a 
second amended petition (Tr., p.33, L.23 - p.34, L.3), and clarified that the second 
amended petition replaced the two previously filed petitions and made the state's 
previous summary dismissal motions moot (Tr., p.36, Ls.9-14; p.38, L.23 - p.39, LA). 
On April 7, 2011, an evidentiary hearing on Steele's second amended petition 
was held in which Steele and his trial counsel, Lawrence Smith, testified. (Tr., pA2, 
L.15 - p.163, L.10.) The district court subsequently entered its "Decision on Petition for 
Post Conviction Relief" (R., pp.173-181), denying both claims presented in Steele's 
second amended petition. Steele timely appealed. (R., pp.182-184.) 
2 
ISSUES 
Steele states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Should post-conviction relief have been granted because the plea 
entered in ignorance of the consequences violated the state and 
federal constitutional guarantees of due process? 
2. Should post-conviction relief have been granted because Mr. Steele 
was denied the state and federal constitutional rights to effective 
assistance of counsel? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.7.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Steele failed to show error in the district court's denial of his petition for post-
conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing? 
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ARGUMENT 
Steele Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Denial Of His Petition For Post-
Conviction Relief 
A. Introduction 
On appeal, Steele first argues that "[t]he failure to advise [him] in a sex offense 
case of the direct consequences of an Alford plea on the penalty that would be imposed 
and ultimately served resulted in the entry of a plea that was not voluntary, knowing and 
intelligent in violation of the state and federal constitutional guarantees of due process." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.?) Steele specifically contends his Alford plea, which permitted 
him to plead guilty without admitting guilt, was invalid because his trial counsel failed to 
advise him "of the consequences of an Alford plea to a sex offense in terms of impact 
on the psychosexual evaluation, the sentence imposed and the sentence ultimately 
served." (Appellant's Brief, p.g.) In his second issue, Steele contends the district court 
erred by denying his claim that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because, 
he argues, "he demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel did not 
advise him of the consequences on his sentence of maintaining his innocence through 
an Alford plea." (ld., p.13.) 
Steele has failed to provide any authority to support the underlying premise that 
his post-plea denial of guilt and refusal to accept responsibility were the inevitable 
consequences of his Alford plea.2 Because Steele has not supported his underlying 
premise with any authority, this Court should refuse to consider Steele's wholly 
2 In turn, Steele argues that his post-plea denials of guilt and refusals to accept 
responsibility led to a negative psychosexual evaluation, a harsher sentence imposed, 
and a longer sentence to be served. (See generally Appellant's Brief, pp.7-12.) 
4 
derivative argument that his Alford plea was invalid because of trial counsel's failure to 
advise him of such consequences. Even if considered on appeal, Steele has failed to 
show it was his Alford plea that resulted in any of the consequences he describes. 
Further, assuming one or more of the consequences Steele cites were caused by his 
Alford plea, they were not direct consequences of such plea and Steele did not have to 
be advised about them in order to enter a constitutionally valid plea. 
Steele's second argument on appeal - ineffective assistance of trial counsel -
fails because it too relies on the legally unsupported and erroneous premise that his 
Alford plea made it inevitable that he would continue to deny guilt and refuse to accept 
responsibility after his plea was entered. Also, Steele failed to present any evidence, 
much less show by a preponderance of evidence, that his trial counsel's performance 
was constitutionally ineffective for failing to inform Steele of the consequences of his 
Alford plea he alleges. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Applications for post-conviction relief under the UPCPA initiate civil proceedings 
in which, like a civil plaintiff, the applicant must prove his or her allegations by a 
preponderance of the evidence." McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570, 225 P.3d 700, 
703 (2010) (citing Hauschulz v. State, 144 Idaho 834,838,172 P.3d 1109, 1113 (2007); 
I.C.R. 57(c)). When the district court conducts an evidentiary hearing and enters 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, an appellate court will disturb the findings of fact 
only if they are clearly erroneous, but will freely review the conclusions of law drawn by 
the district court from those facts. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 276-77, 971 P.2d 
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727, 729-730 (1998). The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their 
testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters solely 
within the province of the district court. Peterson v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d 
108, 110 (Ct. App. 2003). A trial court's decision that a post-conviction petitioner has 
not met his burden of proof is entitled to great weight. Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 
940,792 P.2d 964, 965 (Ct. App. 1990). 
C. The State Did Not Bear Any Burden Of Rebutting Steele's Claim 
\. 
As an initial evidentiary matter, Steele contends on appeal that "all the averments 
in the [second amended petition] must be deemed to be true" because the state did not 
file an answer to that pleading. (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) Steele confuses the role his 
verified second amended petition had with his burden of avoiding summary dismissal, 
and his burden of proving his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence once he 
obtained an evidentiary hearing. Steele's verified second amended petition was not 
admitted as evidence during (or for) the evidentiary hearing; thus, the state was not 
required to rebut it. In Loveland v. State, 141 Idaho 933, 936, 120 P.3d 751, 754 (Ct. 
App. 2005), the Idaho Court of Appeals rejected a similar argument, explaining: 
At the evidentiary hearing, Loveland was required to prove his claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel by a preponderance of the evidence, and 
the standard for avoiding summary dismissal, in which the district court 
was required to accept his allegations as true, was no longer applicable. 
See, e.g., Dunlap v. State, 126 Idaho 901, 909, 894 P.2d 134, 143 (Ct. 
App.1995). 
Loveland also asserts that, because the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act permits the district court to accept affidavits as evidence, 
his application and affidavits automatically constituted evidence for 
purposes of the evidentiary hearing. A verified pleading that sets forth 
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evidentiary facts within the personal knowledge of the verifying signator is, 
in substance, an affidavit and is accorded the same probative force as an 
affidavit. Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 593, 861 P.2d 1253, 1258 (Ct. 
App. 1993). However, the purpose of pleadings is to frame the issues 
upon which a cause is to be tried. Unless introduced into evidence, 
pleadings are not evidence. That Loveland's application was verified did 
not dispense with the need to prove his allegations. 
At a post-conviction evidentiary hearing, the court may receive 
proof by affidavits, depositions, oral testimony, or other evidence and may 
order the applicant brought before it for the hearing. I.C. § 19-4907. 
Section 19-4907, therefore, modifies the rules of evidence insofar as it 
permits the admission of certain forms of hearsay that might otherwise be 
inadmissible. See I.R.E. 801-05. However, Section 19-4907's 
modification of what evidence can be admitted during a post-conviction 
evidentiary hearing does not establish that all potentially admissible 
documents are automatically admitted into evidence. Thus, Section 19-
4907 does not support Loveland's position that his verified application and 
affidavits were automatically introduced into evidence at the evidentiary 
hearing. Further, the adoption of such an interpretation would deprive the 
parties of the opportunity to object to the admissibility of any such proof. 
See I.R.E. 103. 
The district court specifically indicated which documents were being 
made part of the record at the evidentiary hearing. Those documents 
included portions of the record from the underlying criminal proceeding 
and did not include any of the pleadings in the post-conviction action. 
Loveland never offered his pleadings or affidavits in an attempt to 
introduce them into evidence at the evidentiary hearing. Because 
Loveland declined to present any evidence that his counsel ignored his 
request to file a direct appeal, we conclude that the district court did not 
err in dismissing his application. 
(Emphasis added.) 
As in Loveland, there is no indication in the record that the district court in 
Steele's post-conviction case admitted his verified second amended petition and 
supporting affidavit into evidence to be considered at the evidentiary hearing. Contrary 
to Steele's assertion, the averments made in his second amended petition and 
supporting affidavit are not "deemed to be true." (See Appellant's Brief, p.9.) The only 
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relevant evidence in regard to Steele's claim is what was actually presented as 
testimony, or admitted as exhibits, during the evidentiary hearing. 
D. Steele Has Failed To Demonstrate That His Guilty Plea, Entered Pursuant to 
North Carolina v. Alford, Was Not Knowing, Intelligent, And Voluntary 
1. Steele's Underlying Premise That His Continued Denial Of Guilt And 
Refusal To Accept Responsibility For His Crime Were Inevitable Results 
Of His Alford Plea Is Not Supported By Authority And Is Contrary To 
Applicable Law 
Steele challenges the validity of his guilty plea by arguing, as the underlying 
premise to his principle argument, that because the form of his plea under Alford 
permitted him to plead guilty without admitting factual guilt, he was committed and/or 
entitled to deny guilt and refuse to accept responsibility for his crime from that point on. 
(See generally Appellant's Brief, pp.7-12.) In turn, Steele argues that his continuous 
denial of guilt and refusal to accept responsibility for his crime led to direct and negative 
consequences in regard to his (a) psychosexual evaluation (b) sentence imposed, and 
(c) sentence ultimately served. (See generally Appellant's Brief, pp.7-12.) Contrary to 
Steele's presupposition, his Alford plea did not grant him license to thereafter deny guilt 
and refuse to accept responsibility for his crime, and he has failed to present any 
authority to the contrary. 
Steele's underlying premise is, in essence, that an Alford plea constitutes a 
continuing agreement by the trial court and the state that a defendant will be entitled to 
deny guilt and refuse accountability for his or her actions long after the plea is entered, 
and that doing so is an inevitable result of such a plea. (See Appellant's Brief, p.1 0 ("So 
long as an Alford plea is entered, the defendant is asserting his innocence. There is no 
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way to avoid this short of entering a different plea, a straight-up guilty plea which would 
require an innocent defendant to commit perjury.,,3; pp.13-14 ("Here, the law is clear that 
failure to take responsibility for a charged sex offense by admitting guilt at the 
psychosexual evaluation and before the court will, in nearly every single case, result in 
a harsher sentence."). Contrary to Steele's argument, nothing prevented him from 
admitting guilt and accepting responsibility for his crime after he entered his Alford plea, 
and he has provided no authority to the contrary. (See generally Appellant's Brief, pp. 7-
12.) In fact, Steele did attempt to accept some or all responsibility for his crime at his 
sentencing hearing, which belies his assertion that his continuous denial of guilt and 
refusal to accept responsibility for his crime were the inevitable results of his Alford 
3 Rather than requiring "an innocent defendant to commit perjury" by pleading straight-
up, it seems more likely that an innocent defendant would choose to go to trial. 
4 Steele came close to accepting responsibility for his crime during his sentencing 
hearing, telling the court: 
... First of all, Your Honor, I would like to apologize to my daughter. If I 
had touched her inappropriately, I didn't mean to or realize that I had. I 
had wrote a letter here. Your Honor, while thinking I was - it was truly 
possible of doing such an offense in a black out and while incarcerated I 
was cleaning the church .... 
Your Honor, I'm taking this psychosexual evaluation. I answered 
the questions as to my situation. That is why the examiner came to the 
conclusion of high risk. Your Honor, knowing that there was some kind of 
inappropriate touching, if I were 100 percent sure of what I did in the 
offense, I would have answered all of the questions and my interview 
would have been differently .... 
I know I need sex offender treatment to help me answer my own 
questions. I know I have personality traits and issues that need treatment. 
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Steele provides no legal authority that supports his contention that his supposed 
post-plea denials of guilt and refusals to accept responsibility (see id.) were caused by, 
or necessarily resulted from, his Alford plea (see generally Appellant's Brief, pp.7-12). 
In State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259,923 P.2d 966 (1996), the Idaho Supreme Court held: 
When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of law, 
authority, or argument, they will not be considered. Earlier formulations of 
this rule stated that an issue was waived if it was not supported with 
argument and authority. A party waives an issue cited on appeal if either 
authority or argument is lacking, not just if both are lacking. Zichko 
supported this assignment of error with argument but no authority. 
Consequently, he waived this issue on appeal. 
Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263, 923 P.2d at 970 (citations omitted); see I.A.R. 35. Steele has 
faiied to present any authority to support his underlying premise that his Alford plea 
made it inevitable he would continue to deny guilt and refuse to accept responsibility for 
his crime. Accordingly, this Court should refuse to consider Steele's wholly dependent 
and derivative argument that his Alford plea was invalid because his trial counsel failed 
to advise him that his subsequent denial of guilt and refusal to accept responsibility 
would have negative consequences in regard to his psychosexual evaluation, the 
sentence imposed, and the sentence actually served. 
Even if considered on appeal, this Court should reject Steele's underlying 
argument that his Alford plea inevitably resulted in his post-plea denials of guilt and 
refusals to accept responsibility for his crime. Whether Steele accepted responsibility 
Your Honor, I do take full responsibility as my own letter that I wrote 
you says. 
(R., p.112 (p.28, L.8 - p.29, L.14).) 
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and admitted guilt after he entered his Alford plea was completely his choice to make. 
Discussing the possibility Steele would be rehabilitated while in prison, the district court 
explained, "[i]t is Steele's choice to deny in prison and therefore be denied the 
opportunity for rehabilitation." (R., p.178.) Although the court did not specifically state 
that Steele was also free to admit guilt and accept responsibility during his 
psychosexual evaluation and at sentencing, because he was free to do so, the court's 
denial of Steele's first post-conviction claim must nonetheless be upheld. See State v. 
White, 102 Idaho 924, 925, 644 P.2d 318, 319 (1982) ("This Court has held that where 
a ruling is correct it is immaterial that the reason given by the trial court for admitting the 
evidence may have been incorrect."); State v. Morris, 119 Idaho 448, 450, 807 P.2d 
1286,1288 (Ct. App. 1991) (on appellate review, the lower court's ruling must be upheld 
if it is capable of being upheld on any theory). 
In State v. Alston, 534 S.E.2d 666 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000), the North Carolina Court 
of Appeals, relying in part on State v. Howry, 127 Idaho 94, 896 P. 2d 1002, 1004 (Ct. 
App. 1995), explained, in the context of a challenge to a probation revocation 
proceeding, that an Alford plea does not result in any special privileges beyond the plea 
entry hearing: 
... [A]n "Alford plea" constitutes "a guilty plea in the same way that 
a plea of nolo contendere or no contest is a guilty plea." State ex reI. 
Warren v. Schwarz, 219 Wis.2d 615, 579 N.W.2d 698, 706 (1998); see 
Alford, 400 US. at 37, 91 S.Ct. at 167-68, 27 L. Ed. 2d at 171 (no "material 
difference between a plea that refuses to admit commission of the criminal 
act and a plea containing a protestation of innocence"); [People v.J 
Birdsong, 958 P.2d [1124J at 1130 [Colo. 1998] ("An Alford plea is to be 
treated as a guilty plea and a sentence may be imposed accordingly."). 
As a consequence, in accepting an "Alford plea" as 
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a concession to [a] defendant, [the trial court accords that 
defendant] no implications or assurances as to future 
revocation proceedings. 
Birdsong, 958 P.2d at 1129. In other words, an "Alford plea" is in no way 
"infused with any special promises," Warren, 579 N.W.2d at 711, nor does 
acceptance thereof constitute "a promise that a defendant will never have 
to admit his guilt," id. 
As the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated in Warren: 
[a] defendant's protestations of innocence under an Alford 
plea extend only to the plea itself. 
... "There is nothing inherent in the nature of an Alford plea 
that gives a defendant any rights, or promises any 
limitations, with respect to the punishment imposed after the 
conviction. " 
... Put simply, an Alford plea is not the saving grace for 
defendants who wish to maintain their complete innocence. 
Rather, it is a device that defendants may call upon to avoid 
the expense, stress and embarrassment of trial and to limit 
one's exposure to punishment [and it is] not the saving grace 
for defendants who wish to maintain their complete 
innocence. 
Id. at 707 (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see generally Smith v. 
Com., 27 Va.App. 357, 499 S.E.2d 11, 13 (1998) (quoting State v. Howry, 
127 Idaho 94, 896 P. 2d 1002, 1004 (Ct. App. 1995)) ("'[ A]lthough an 
Alford plea allows a defendant to plead guilty amid assertions of 
innocence, it does not require a court to accept those assertions ... [but 
the court may] consider all relevant information regarding the crime, 
including [the] defendant's lack of remorse.' "). 
Alston, 534 S.E.2d at 669-670. 
The principles expressed in Alston show that an Alford plea does not allow any 
preferential treatment of a defendant after the plea is entered. Adopting the language of 
Alston, "[Steele's] protestations of innocence under an Alford plea extend only to the 
12 
plea itself." kl (quoting Warren v. Schwarz, 579 N.W.2d 698, 707 (1998)). Because 
Steele was not entitled by virtue of the form of his guilty plea to thereafter deny guilt and 
refuse to accept responsibility for his crime, his underlying argument is erroneous. As a 
result, Steele's resultant argument that his Alford plea necessarily caused him adverse 
sentencing consequences is erroneous. Because the premise underlying Steele's issue 
has no merit, Steele's first issue is fatally flawed, and this Court should reject it outright. 
In sum, Steele has failed to present any authority supporting his underlying 
argument that his Alford plea inevitably resulted in his post-plea denials of guilt and 
refusals to accept responsibility for his crime, and, under Zichko, this Court should 
refuse to consider Steele's wholly dependent issue on appeal. Further, as the Alston 
decision states, Steele's "protestations of innocence" inherent in his Alford plea "extend 
only to the plea itself" - not beyond. Alston, 534 S.E.2d at 670. Because Steele's first 
issue is entirely contingent upon the erroneous underlying premise that his Alford plea 
made it inevitable he would continue to deny guilt and accept responsibility for his 
crime, Steele has failed to show the district court erred in denying his first claim. See 
White, 102 Idaho at 925, 644 P.2d at 319; Morris, 119 Idaho at 450, 807 P.2d at 1288. 
2. Even Assuming The Consequences Of Steele's Alford Plea Were As He 
Alleges, They Were Not "Direct" Consequences Under Heredia And He 
Was Not Required To Be Advised About Them Before Entering A Valid 
Plea 
"The longstanding test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is whether the 
plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of 
action open to the defendant." Lint v. State, 145 Idaho 472, 481, 180 P.3d 511, 520 (Ct. 
13 
App. 2008) (citing Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 60, 106 P.3d 376, 386 (2004)). "For a 
guilty plea to be valid, the entire record must demonstrate that the plea was entered into 
in a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent manner." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 
527, 164 P.3d 798, 807 (2007) (citing State v. Heredia, 144 Idaho 95, 96, 156 P.3d 
1193, 1194 (2007». Determining whether a plea is voluntary involves three inquiries: 
"(1) whether the defendant's plea was voluntary in the sense that he understood the 
nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and 
intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial; and (3) whether the defendant understood 
the consequences of pleading guilty." kL (citing State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32, 34, 557 
P.2d 626, 628 (1976». ''The trial court is not required to inform a defendant of 
consequences that are collateral or indirect." Heredia, 144 Idaho at 97, 156 P.3d at 
1195 (citing State v. Huffman, 137 Idaho 886, 887, 55 P.3d 879, 880 (Ct. App. 2002); 
and Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96, 99-101, 982 P.2d 931, 934-36 (1999». 
Relying on Heredia, Steele argues that the consequences his Alford plea had on 
his psychosexual evaluation, the sentence imposed, and the sentence actually served, 
are direct consequences which he was required to be informed about in order for his 
Alford plea to be considered knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-
12.) Contrary to Steele's argument, there were no consequences, direct or indirect, of 
his Alford plea in the ways he alleges; therefore, review under Heredia to determine if 
the consequences are direct or indirect is pointless. As previously discussed (see § 
D.1, supra), Steele has failed to show that the negative consequences he points to were 
caused by his Alford plea instead of his own post-plea decisions to continue to deny 
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guilt and refuse to accept responsibility for his crime. Inasmuch as Steele has failed to 
show any adverse consequences of his Alford plea, review under Heredia is 
unnecessary to determine if such unrelated "consequences" are direct or indirect. 
Even assuming one or more consequences flowed from Steele's Alford plea in 
the manner he alleges, they are not direct consequences under Heredia.5 In Heredia, 
the Idaho Supreme Court reaffirmed the three-factor test for determining if a 
consequence is direct or collateral previously set forth in Ray, 133 Idaho at 99-101,982 
P.2d at 934-36: "(1) the defendant's power to prevent the consequence; (2) the punitive 
or remedial nature of the consequence; and (3) the amount of control the sentencing 
judge has over imposing the consequence." Heredia, 144 Idaho at 98, 156 P.3d at 
1196. "These factors indicate that a direct consequence is involved where a judge has 
a large amount of control over the consequence and the defendant has no power to 
prevent its occurrence." lil Application of these factors shows that the consequences 
of Steele's Alford plea upon his psychosexual evaluation, the sentence imposed, and 
the sentence actually served, are indirect or collateral. 
First, and as previously discussed, whether Steele accepted responsibility and 
admitted guilt after he entered his Alford plea was completely within his own power to 
decide. See §O.1, supra. As the district court explained in regard to Steele's 
5 Although the district court did not specifically determine that, under Heredia, the 
consequences of Steele's Alford plea were indirect and collateral, the court reached 
several conclusions consistent with such a finding. In any event, the district court's 
ruling should be upheld on the correct legal theory that, under Heredia, the 
consequences that Steele alleges resulted from his Alford plea were indirect and 
collateral. White, 102 Idaho at 925, 644 P.2d at 319; Morris, 119 Idaho at 450, 807 
P .2d at 1288. 
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rehabilitative potential while incarcerated, "[i]t is Steele's choice to deny in prison and 
therefore be denied the opportunity for rehabilitation." (R., p.178.) Likewise, Steele had 
the ability to admit his guilt and accept responsibility for his crime during his 
psychosexual interview and at his sentencing hearing; his Alford plea did not prevent 
him from doing so. (See § 0.1, supra.) Steele's statement during his sentencing 
hearing discredits his argument that his Alford plea locked him into a course of 
continuous denial of guilt and refusal to accept responsibility. Steele chose at each 
point after his plea whether to admit guilt and accept responsibility for his criminal 
conduct - his Alford plea was irrelevant to those decisions. The first factor of Heredia, 
whether Steele had power to control the consequences of his Alford plea, clearly favors 
a finding that those consequences are indirect or collateral. 
The second factor under Heredia is whether the consequences of Steele's Alford 
plea are punitive or remedial. Heredia, 144 Idaho at 98, 156 P.3d at 1196. As explained 
previously (see § 0.1, supra), Steele's Alford plea did not cause any of the 
consequences he claims. Rather, Steele's voluntary choices to deny guilt and refuse to 
accept responsibility (to the extent he actually did so) during his psychosexual 
evaluation, his sentencing hearing, and while incarcerated, are responsible for any 
negative consequences he may have encountered. Even if Steele's Alford plea resulted 
in the consequences he now asserts, the functions provided by a psychosexual 
evaluation, probation, and parole are plainly remedial in nature, not punitive. See 
Franklin v. State, 87 Idaho 291, 307, 392 P.2d 552, 561-562 (1964) (emphasis added) 
("Because of their humane provisions and their highly remedial nature, statutes 
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providing for suspension of sentence and probation are universally given liberal 
construction."); United States v. Pinjuv, 218 F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting 
Standlee v. Rhay, 557 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1977) ("Revocation of parole is remedial 
rather than punitive, since it seeks to protect the welfare of parolees and the safety of 
society. The termination of parole results in a deprivation of liberty and thus is a 
grievous loss to the parolee. But the harshness of parole revocation does not alter its 
remedial nature."). 
The third Heredia factor is the amount of control the sentencing judge had over 
imposing the consequences Steele complains of. lsi The consequence Steele cites in 
regard to his psychosexual evaluation is its conclusion that he was a high risk to 
reoffend. (Appellant's Brief, p.10 ("District Court's statements at sentencing that the 
most troubling aspect of his case was [Steele's] failure to admit factual guilt, that as a 
result of that failure he was evaluated to be a high risk for reoffense"); p.11 ("Mr. Steele 
faced the other consequences of a poorer psychosexual evaluation"); see PSI, p.69 
(finding Steele a high risk to reoffend).) The district court plainly had no control over 
whether Steele's psychosexual evaluation rated him a higher risk to reoffend because 
he entered an Alford plea. That control rested solely in the hands of the evaluator and 
Steele himself. Next, as discussed, because the consequence Steele alleges his Alford 
plea had on the sentence imposed is based on his fallacious premise that his trial 
counsel promised him a rider, there was no consequence the sentencing judge could 
have controlled in that regard. Finally, the sentencing judge has absolutely no control 
over any consequence Steele's Alford plea may have over the sentence he actually 
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serves while in confinement. As the district court explained, "[n]either the court nor 
counsel can control the decisions of the Department of Corrections or the Board of 
Pardons and Parole." (R., p.178.) The third Heredia factor weighs in favor of a finding 
that the consequences of Steele's Alford plea are indirect. 
Application of the three Heredia factors supports a finding that the consequences 
Steele complains about are indirect or collateral. Therefore, Steele's Alford plea was 
entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently without him being advised of those 
potential indirect consequences. Steele has failed to demonstrate that the district court 
erred in denying his claim that his Alford plea was not valid. 
E. Steele Failed To Demonstrate That His Trial Counsel Provided Ineffective 
Assistance 
1. Steele's Underlying Premise To His Second Issue, That His Post-Plea 
Denials Of Guilt And Refusals To Accept Responsibility For His Crime 
Were Inevitable Results Of His Alford Plea, Is Not Supported By Authority 
And Runs Counter To Applicable Law 
In his second issue on appeal, Steele argues: 
In this case, [he] proved deficient performance because he 
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel did not 
advise him of the consequences on his sentence of maintaining his 
innocence through an Alford plea. Counsel was not just merely inaccurate 
in predicting the likely outcome. Counsel failed altogether to recognize 
and advise his client that in a sex case maintaining one's innocence will 
lead to a poor psychosexual evaluation and inevitability a harsher 
sentence than would be imposed .... 
Here, the law is clear that failure to take responsibility for a charged 
sex offense by admitting guilt at the psychosexual evaluation and before 
the court will, in nearly every single case, result in a harsher sentence. .. 
. Thus, counsel had an absolute duty to give Mr. Steele correct advice 
that his denial of guilt would result in a greater sentence. 
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(Appellant's Brief, pp.13-14 (citations omitted, emphasis added).) 
Although it may be more likely that the failure to admit guilt and accept 
responsibility after entering an Alford plea will result in a harsher sentence, Steele again 
fails to provide any authority to support his underlying premise that his Alford plea 
caused him to steadfastly continue to deny guilt and refuse to accept responsibility for 
his crime. 6 In regard to Steele's first issue on appeal, the state has previously 
discussed, in § D.1, supra, his failure to present any viable authority to support that 
underlying premise, under both Zichko and the merits of the argument. The state relies 
upon that analysis and argument to explain why this Court should refuse to consider, or 
deny on the merits, Steele's ineffective assistance of counsel claim because it is 
predicated on the same unsupported and meritless underlying premise. In short, Steele 
freely chose, after he entered his Alford plea, whether he would continue to deny guilt 
and refuse to accept responsibility for his crime. 
2. Steele Failed To Show That His Trial Counsel Was Constitutionally 
Ineffective 
At the beginning of the plea entry hearing, the prosecutor explained that the plea 
agreement called for Steele to enter an Alford plea of guilt to the amended charge of 
sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen (I.C. § 18-1506) and obtain a SANE 
6 Steele's citation to Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (Ct. App. 2006), is 
inapposite. (See Appellant's Brief, p.14.) In Estrada, the Idaho Supreme Court held 
that a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to obtain accurate advice from counsel 
about the Fifth Amendment right to invoke silence and decline participation in a 
psychosexual evaluation because such evaluation "may" support a harsher sentence. 
lQ.,. at 564, 149 P.3d at 839. Estrada does not in any way support Steele's contention 
that an Alford plea inevitably results in a harsher sentence. 
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(psychosexual) evaluation prior to sentencing. (R., p.151 (p.i, L.15 - p.3, L.4).) The 
plea agreement allowed for "open sentencing" and the state agreed not to file additional 
charges for past incidents with respect to two males related to Steele. (R., p.151 (p.2, 
L.25 - p.3, L.15).) Steele was asked by the district judge whether "any other promises 
[have] been made to [him] beyond what's been told to [the court] today in the 
courtroom?", and answered "[n]o, ma'am." (R., p.151 (p.4, Ls.15-18).) Steele's 
attorney acknowledged he had discussed with Steele "his rights, defenses and possible 
consequences to him of a plea of guilty," and Steele affirmed he had "sufficient time to 
discuss this case and all of its ramifications" with his trial attorney, and did not desire 
more time to do so. (R., p.152 (p.5, L.24 - p.6, L.5).) 
On appeal, Steele claims he "proved deficient performance because he 
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel did not advise him of 
the consequences on his sentence of maintaining his innocence through an Alford 
plea." (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) Steele further contends his trial counsel "failed 
altogether to recognize and advise [him] that in a sex case maintaining one's innocence 
will lead to a poor psychosexual evaluation and inevitability [sic] a harsher sentence 
than would otherwise be imposed." (Id.) Even assuming the consequences of Steele's 
Alford plea were as alleged, Steele failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
presented at the evidentiary hearing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance 
by allegedly failing to inform Steele of such consequences. 
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a. Legal Standards Applicable To Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
Claims Involving Guilty Pleas 
Where the petitioner alleges entitlement to relief based upon ineffective 
assistance of counsel, in order to prevail, the petitioner "must establish that his counsel 
was deficient in his performance and that this deficiency resulted in prejudice to the 
claimant." Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 922, 828 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Ct. App. 1992) 
(citing State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 776 P.2d 424 (1989». "There is a strong 
presumption that counsel's performance falls within the wide range of professional 
assistance, and the defendant bears the burden of proving that counsel's representation 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." ~ (citing State v. Charboneau, 
116 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (1989». In addition, it is well-established that "[a] fair 
assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the 
distorting effects of hindsight ... and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective 
at the time." Maxfield v. State, 108 Idaho 493, 700 P.2d 115 (Ct. App. 1985) (citing 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (ellipses original». 
To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must "show a reasonable probability that 
the outcome of the trial would be different but for counsel's deficient performance." 
McKay, 148 Idaho at 570, 225 P.3d at 703 (citing State v. Row, 131 Idaho 303, 312, 
955 P.2d 1082, 1091 (1998». '''A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.'" ~ (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 
When the alleged deficiency involves counsel's advice in relation to a guilty plea, "in 
order to satisfy the 'prejudice' requirement, the defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty 
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and would have insisted on going to triaL" Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) 
(footnote and citations omitted)? The focus of a determination of whether a defendant 
would not have pleaded guilty is the defendant's state of mind at the time the guilty plea 
was entered. McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 852, 103 P.3d 460, 465 (2004) ("In 
other words, the likelihood that without counsel's errors a defendant mayor may not 
have been able to prevail at trial is relevant only to the extent it sheds light on the 
defendant's state of mind when he pleaded guilty."); see Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. 
"Moreover, to obtain relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must convince the court that 
a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances." 
Padilla v. Kentucky, _ U.S. _, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010) (citing Roe v. Flores-
Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000)). Application of the standards to the evidence presented 
demonstrates the district court did not err in denying Steele's ineffective assistance 
claim. 
7 In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, the Supreme Court hypothesized that, where an 
attorney has failed to discover or investigate potentially eXCUlpatory evidence, the 
assessment of whether a defendant would have gone to trial instead of pleading guilty 
"will depend in large part on a prediction whether the evidence likely would have 
changed the outcome of a triaL" As explained in McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 852, 
103 P.3d 460,465 (2004), in contrast to the scenario described in Hill: 
[HJere the alleged ineffectiveness of counsel involves issues surrounding 
the reservations of rights agreement, and has nothing to do with issues 
that would be raised at trial. Therefore, here we simply apply the test 
articulated in Hill requiring a defendant "show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty 
and would have insisted on going to triaL" Id. 
140 Idaho at 852, 103 P.3d at 465. 
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b. Steele Has Failed To Demonstrate His Trial Counsel's Performance 
Was Deficient 
In apparent reliance on Padilla v. Kentucky, _ U.S. __ , 130 S.Ct. 1473 
(2010), Steele contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to advise 
Steele "of the consequences on his sentence of maintaining his innocence through an 
Alford plea," and "that in a sex caseL] maintaining one's innocence will lead to a poor 
psychosexual evaluation and inevitability [sic] a harsher sentence than would otherwise 
be imposed.,,8 (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) Padilla does not support Steele's claim. 
The issue in Padilla was whether the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective 
assistance of counsel requires a criminal defense attorney to advise his or her non-
citizen client whether the client's plea carries the risk of deportation. l.Q." at _, 130 
S.Ct. at 1477-78. Addressing this issue in the first instance, the lower court held that 
Padilla's counsel had no obligation to give Padilla correct advice, or even to advise him 
at all, that the offense to which he was pleading guilty would result in his deportation 
from this country because, the court reasoned, deportation was "merely a 'collateral 
consequence'" of Padilla's guilty plea. l.Q." at _, 130 S.Ct. at 1478 (citation omitted). 
8 Steele also cites Estrada, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833, in support of his claim that 
his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him that his Alford plea would result 
in a negative psychosexual evaluation and a harsher sentence. (See Appellant's Brief, 
pp.13-14.) As discussed, Steele has failed to show that his Alford plea compelled him 
to thereafter deny guilt and refuse to accept responsibility for his crime. Therefore, 
Steele cannot show that his Alford plea caused the consequences he complains about. 
Further, Estrada requires defense counsel to advise defendants who undergo a 
court-ordered psychosexual evaluation that they have a Fifth Amendment right to invoke 
silence and decline to participate in such evaluation. Inasmuch as Steele's plea 
agreement required him to participate in a psychosexual evaluation, Estrada does not 
apply. (See R., p.151 (p.1, L.15 - p.3, L.4).) 
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The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning, stating, "We have never applied a 
distinction between direct and collateral consequences to define the scope of 
constitutionally 'reasonable professional assistance' required under Strickland [v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)]." Padilla, _ U.S. at _, 130 S.Ct. at 1481. 
The Court discussed the practical effects of deportation and stated its view that 
"[d]eportation as a consequence of a criminal conviction is, because of its close 
connection to the criminal process, uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a 
collateral consequence." lJi at _, 130 S.Ct. at 1482. The Court ultimately concluded, 
however, that whether counsel performed deficiently in failing to correctly advise Padilla 
of the deportation consequences of his plea turned not on the question of whether 
deportation is a direct or collateral consequence of a guilty plea, but rather on whether 
counsel's performance was objectively reasonable "under prevailing professional 
norms." lJi at _, 130 S.Ct. at 1482 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). Holding that 
"[t]he weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that counsel must 
advise her client regarding the risk of deportation," the Supreme Court determined that 
the allegations in Padilla's petition were sufficient to satisfy the deficient performance 
prong of Strickland. 9 Padilla, _ U.S. at _, 130 S.Ct. at 1482-83. 
First, and most significantly, Steele presented no testimony or evidence during 
his evidentiary hearing in regard to whether the "weight of prevailing professional 
norms" supports his contention that trial counsel must advise their clients that, if they 
enter an Alford plea to a sex offense, they will receive a negative psychosexual 
9 Padilla specifically held that "counsel must inform her client whether his plea carries a 
risk of deportation." Padilla, _ U.S. at __ , 130 S.Ct. at 1486. 
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evaluation and a harsher sentence. (See generally Tr., pp.41-162.) Based on Steele's 
failure to present such evidence, he failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel's 
performance was deficient under Strickland. See Maxwell v. Larkins, 2010 WL 2680333 
*10 (E.D. Mo. 2010) (no clear direction from professional organizations on the subject of 
advising defendants in regard to sex offender registries or Sexually Violent Predator Act 
procedures). 
Additionally, in Padilla the Supreme Court noted that "recent changes in our 
immigration law have made removal nearly an automatic result for a broad class of 
noncitizen offenders." Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1481 (emphasis added). In contrast, 
Steele's Alford plea, by itself, caused no adverse consequence on his psychosexual 
evaluation or his sentence. (See §§ 0.1, E.1, supra.) Therefore, Padilla's requirement 
of advisements, which was based upon the existence of some risk of a deportation 
consequence, has no application to Steele's case. See Padilla, _ U.S. at __ , 130 
S.Ct. at 1483 ("When the law is not succinct and straightforward ... a criminal defense 
attorney need do no more than advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges 
may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences. But when the deportation 
consequence is truly clear, as it was in this case, the duty to give correct advice is 
equally clear."); Brown v. Goodwin, 2010 WL 1930574 *13 (D.N.J. 2010) ("However, 
while Padilla's implications for cases involving removal are clear, the holding of Padilla 
seems not importable - either entirely or, at the very least, not readily importable - into 
scenarios involving collateral consequences other than deportation."); Maxwell, 2010 
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WL 2680333 at *10 (commitment as a Sexually Violent Predator in Missouri is not as 
automatic as deportation was in Padilla). 
Steele has failed to demonstrate, both in the district court and on appeal, that his 
trial counsel provided deficient performance under Strickland. 
c. Steele Has Failed To Demonstrate He Was Prejudiced By Trial 
Counsel's Performance 
The gist of Steele's claim is that he would have gone to trial if his trial counsel 
had advised him that by entering an Alford plea he would, thereafter, inevitably deny 
guilt and refuse to accept responsibility for his crime, which would lead to a poorer 
psychosexual evaluation and harsher sentence. (See generally Appellant's Brief, 
pp.12-16.) Assuming, arguendo, Steele is able to demonstrate deficient performance 
by his trial counsel, he must, under Strickland, show there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted 
on going to trial. Hill, 474 U.S. at 58. Steele has failed to show he would have gone to 
trial absent trial counsel's allegedly deficient performance. 
During the evidentiary hearing, Steele testified he pled guilty because he thought 
he was going to receive a retained jurisdiction and probation; otherwise he would have 
insisted on going to trial. (Tr., p.51, Ls.1-10; p.53, Ls.2-4; p.62, L.11 - p.63, L.2; p.79, 
Ls.13-15; p.87, Ls.6-9; p.101, Ls.14-18.) However, Steele's mere allegation that he 
would not have pled guilty absent counsel's deficient performance is not sufficient, 
standing alone, to demonstrate prejudice under Strickland. McKeeth, 140 Idaho at 852, 
103 P.3d at 464; Hayes v. State, 143 Idaho 88, 93, 137 P.3d 475, 480 (Ct. App. 2006) 
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(same). The relevant focus in determining whether Steele would have gone to trial 
absent trial counsel's deficient performance, is what his state of mind was when he pled 
guilty. McKeeth, 140 Idaho at 852, 103 P.3d at 465; see Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. A review 
of the evidentiary hearing testimony of Steele's trial counsel and Steele's sentence 
hearing statements show that his state of mind at the time he entered his Alford plea 
was to admit guilt, with the explanation that he was too intoxicated at the time of the 
offense to recall it, and to accept responsibility for his offense. At the evidentiary 
hearing, Steele's trial counsel testified that he did not think Steele was going to have 
any problem with accepting responsibility for his crime, as he explained in the following 
colloquy with the prosecutor: 
Q. Had you read psychosexual evaluations before -
A. Yes. 
Q. -- where people had taken responsibility but couldn't remember 
exactly what happened? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And do you remember whether or not those were always high risk 
to reoffend? 
A. I couldn't say. I don't think they're always high risk, though. 
Q. Now did you think that showing remorse was going to be any 
problem for Mr. Steele? 
A. No. 
Q. How come? 
27 
A. Well, he had indicated to me - while he indicated that he had no 
recollection of the acts, he realized that he had caused great damage to 
his family, to his own wife, to his family, by not being able to be present to 
be a role model to help out in their lives, to provide support, and so I know 
he was remorseful in a number of ways. 
Q. And that's what you knew before he pled guilty? 
A. Yes. 
(Tr., p.146, L.24 - p.148, L.7.) 
Steele's comments to the district court during the sentencing hearing support trial 
counsel's view of what Steele's state of mind was when he entered his Alford plea. In 
those comments, Steele essentially admitted that he may have committed the offense 
but had no recall of it due to being intoxicated, and accepted some or all responsibility 
for the offense. See fn. 4, supra. In light of Steele's trial counsel's testimony and 
Steele's admissions of guilt (without recall of his actions) and acceptance of 
responsibility for his crime, his naked allegation that he would not have pled guilty if his 
trial counsel would have informed him that his psychosexual evaluation and sentence 
would be negatively impacted by his Alford plea rings hollow. 
Moreover, Steele has failed to demonstrate why going to trial instead of entering 
an Alford plea would have been a rational decision. Padilla, _ U.S. __ , 130 S.Ct. 
1473, 1485 (2010). He argues that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to advise 
him that "an Alford plea represented ... the worse [sic] of the possible pleas because 
he would lose all the constitutional rights associated with trial and be convicted and 
sentenced, but he would also not get the benefit in sentencing and later parole 
decisions of having acknowledged his guilt and thus rendered himself amenable to 
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rehabilitation." (Appellant's Brief, p.14 (emphasis added).) If, as Steele seems to 
contend on appeal, one of his goals was to avoid a harsher sentence resulting from his 
continued denial of guilt and refusal to accept responsibility produced by his Alford plea, 
going to trial would not have aided his cause. Steele has not explained why he would 
have admitted guilt and accepted responsibility for his crime after a jury trial, but could 
not do so after entering an Alford plea. 
Steele has failed to demonstrate prejudice under Strickland because he did not 
provide any evidence, apart from his mere allegation, showing that he would have made 
a rational decision to go to trial if his trial counsel would have advised him properly. 
Instead, the testimony and evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing serves only to 
refute Steele's claim. 
d. Because The Denial Of Steele's Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
Claim Was Correct, Although For Different Reasons Than The 
District Court Articulated, It Must Be Affirmed 
The district court's reasons for denying Steele's claim that his trial counsel 
provided ineffective assistance differ from the above analysis showing Steele failed to 
demonstrate, under Strickland, his trial counsel's performance was deficient, and that 
such performance was prejudicial. 1O Inasmuch as the district court's denial of Steele's 
10 The district court held: 
Generally [Steele] alleges his counsel should not have allowed him to 
submit to a psychosexual evaluation; he was denied the right to 
meaningful adversarial testing at sentencing; the evaluation is 
presumptively unreliable; Steele has thirty lay witnesses that contradict the 
doctor's diagnosis, and Dr. Johnsons' [sic] diagnosis was tainted by 
Steele's claim of innocence and Alford plea. Steele has failed to prove his 
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ineffectiveness claim can be upheld on grounds different than the court articulated, it 
must be upheld. White, 102 Idaho at 925,644 P.2d at 319. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's decision, 
following an evidentiary hearing, denying Steele's post-conviction petition claims. 
DATED this 29th day of March, 2012. 
counsel was ineffective in these areas. The evaluation was performed by 
a neutral professional and the evaluation was a requirement of his plea 
agreement to get the reduction he wanted. The evaluation provides much 
information in the form of Steele's history as well as testing. Dr. Johnsons' 
[sic] conclusions were based on substantial information about the 
defendant. There is no evidence that any of Steele's thirty witnesses are 
qualified in psychosexual evaluations. 
Steele claims his counsel relinquished his role as advocate when 
he allowed Steele to submit to a psychosexual evaluation, despite 
knowing what the conclusions would be. There is no evidence Mr. Smith 
knew what the conclusions would be. He, the court and the prosecutor 
learned of the conclusions after the evaluation was completed. 
(R, p.1BO.) 
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